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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Ramiro Nevarez's judgment of conviction for robbery, in violation 
of Idaho Code $3 18-6501, 18-6502(2), and 18-204. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of October 27,2006, an all-call from dispatch to law 
enforcement officers reported that the Maverik convenience store in Rupert, Idaho, had just been 
robbed. Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript (MS Tr.) pp. 25-26. Approximately eight miles 
away, Joe Moore, a patrol deputy for the Minidoka County Sheriff's Office, wasin his patrol 
vehicle finishing a meal and heard the call from dispatch. MS Tr. pp. 26-27. Responding to the 
call, Deputy Moore activated his overhead lights and began traveling east toward Rupert on 
Highway 25 at a high rate of speed intending to travel to the robbery location. MS Tr. pp. 27 & 
29. Dispatch had advised Deputy Moore, and others, that the robbery suspects were two 
individuals wearing hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stocking caps, and perhaps canying a black 
pistol. MS Tr. p. 27. Officer Moore also recalled being informed the two individuals were 
probably Hispanic. MS Tr. pp. 28-29. 
After traveling approximately half a mile, Deputy Moore decided to turn off his overhead 
lights and slow his speed, yet continue traveling east toward Rupert. MS Tr. pp. 29-30. In doing 
so, Deputy Moore began "checking vellicles" as they passed in the opposite direction. MS Tr. p. 
30. Deputy Moore recalled passing two or three vehicles west of Paul, Idaho, and another within 
the city limits of Paul. Id. 
As he left Paul, continuing east toward Rupert, Deputy Moore observed another vehicle. 
Apparently, this one caught his eye because, as it was approaching the City of Paul, it was 
traveling 42 miles per hour even though the posted speed limit permitted 55 miles per hour. MS 
Tr. pp. 3 1 & 34. Because it was dark and there was no other significant lighting in the area, 
Deputy Moore believed he could maximize the light coming from a Texaco sign and the canopy 
over some gas pumps at a nearby gas station in order to get a better look at the occupants of this 
westbound vehicle. MS Tr. pp. 34-35. As a result, Deputy Moore slowed his vehicle to 
approximately 35 miles per hour so he could "coordinate" the passing of vehicles. MS Tr. p. 34. 
Even though the lighting was suspect and the two vehicles were passing each other at a 
rate of 112.88 feet per second, Deputy Moore was able to observe what appeared to be four bald 
headed Hispanic individuals in a "low-riding position," moving, turning, and looking around. 
MS Tr. pp. 36-38,43, & 53. Deputy Moore then turned around and caught up to the four 
individuals within approximately 40 seconds. MS Tr. pp. 38-39. By this point the vehicle had 
properly slowed down in order lo comply with the 35 miles per hour speed limit zone it was 
entering. MS Tr. p. 39. The vehicle then lawfully displayed its right blinker and moved into the 
right lane as the two-lane highway became a four-lane road in the City of Paul. Id. The vehicle 
continued westbound through Paul and lawfully signaled to turn right on Third Street. MS Tr. p. 
46. At this point Deputy Moore "felt like [he] needed to check out" the vehicle. MS Tr. p. 46. 
Deputy Moore engaged his overhead lights and effectuated a traffic stop. Id. Thereafter, the four 
individuals in the vehicle were identified as Ramiro Nevarez, Arturo Flores, Logan Brizee, and 
Marco ~imenez, and all four were eventually arrested for suspicion of robbery. 
Mr. Nevarez filed a Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-852(a), seeking to retain the services of Marc Green, Ph.D. Record (R.) 104- 
116. Mr. Nevarez, based upon Dr. Green's expertise as a spacial and visual expert, sought to 
challenge the observations made by Deputy Moore in the early morning hours of October 27, 
2006, and his assertion of reasonable suspicion warranting a traffic stop of Mr. Nevarez's 
vehicle. Id. Mr. Nevarez contended the testimony of Deputy Moore was highly suspect and the 
testimony of Dr. Green would provide essential information and assist the trier of fact in 
ascertaining what in fact could have been and was observed by Deputy Moore. Motion for 
Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness Hearing Transcript (AF Tr.) pp. 4-9. The State filed 
an Objection to Defendant's Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness, arguing 
publlc funds should not he expended and Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 precludes such testimony. 
Following a hearing on March 9,2007, the Hon. Jolm Melanson issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness on March 26,2007, denying 
Mr. Nevarez's motion. R. 131-138. Judge Melanson concluded: 
The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what he observed at night while 
passing each other and then througb his rearview mirror after the vehicles had 
passed can, if necessary to decide this case, be determined by the court without the 
assistance of an expert witness. It is the fact-finder's function to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. 
R. 137. Judge Melanson found the expenditure of funds was not required at this stage in the 
proceedings. Id. 
Subsequently, on April 16,2007, with the Hon. Barry Wood now presiding, a hearing 
was held on Mr. Nevarez's Motion to Suppress. R. 140. At the conclusion of the hearing, in 
which Deputy Moore was the only person to testify, Judge Wood denied Mr. Nevarez's motion, 
upholdiilg the validity of the traffic stop by a "razor thin" margin. MS Tr. p. 79. Nonetheless, 
Judge Wood encouraged Mr. Nevarez to appeal because the denial of his request for an expert 
was by a different judge and he felt there was a lack of case law applicable to the facts presented. 
MS Tr. pp. 74-80. 
Mr. Nevarez entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the district 
court's denial of his Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness and his Motion to 
Suppress. R. 173-176. This timely appeal follows. R. 198-200. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was it futldainentally unfair and thus a violation of Mr. Nevarez's constitutional and 
statutory rights for the district court to deprive him of the expert services required to present an 
adequate defense? 
2. Was there a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupa~~ts of the car were the 
robbers of the store when they did not match the description other than by their ethnicity? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denyine Mr. Nevarez's Motion for Apportionment 
of Funds for Expert Witness. 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Nevarez's request for an expert 
witness at state expense because in doing so it denied him hndalnental fairness as embodied in 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his right 
to present evidence pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. 
The decision to authorize the expenditure of state funds for an indigent defendant 
generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395, 
648 P.2d 203,207 (1982). In determilling whether the trial court abused its discretion, the 
reviewing court often considers "whether the court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558,758 P.2d 
713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Standards of Appellate Review in State and Federal Courts, 5 
3.4, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK (Idaho Law Fou~~dation, Inc. 1985)). 
1. Mr. Nevarez made a suflcient showing that the expert testimony was necessary in 
order topresent an adequate defense to the prosecution's case. 
As a11 indigent defendant, Mr. Nevarez was entitled to the assistance of an expert witness 
at state expense because it was necessary for the development of a significant element of his 
defense. Alte v. Oltlahorna, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). As stated by the Ake Court: 
This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to bear 
on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that 
the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. This elementary 
principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives fiom the belief that just cannot 
be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his 
liberty is at stake. 
[Wlhile the Court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent 
defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy, it has often 
reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an adequate 
opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system." To 
implement this principle, we have focused on identifying the "basic tools of an 
adequate defense or appeal," and we have required that such tools be provided to 
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. 
Analogous to the constitutional rationale sel forth in Ake, Idaho Code 5 19-852(a)(2) 
provides: 
(a) A needy person . . . who is under formal charge of having committed, or is 
being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled: 
. . . .  
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation 
(including investigation and other preparation). The attorney, services, and 
facilities and the court costs shall be provided at public expense to the extent that 
the person is, at the time the court determines need, unable to provide for their 
payment. 
In State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to interpret section 19-852(a) and stated: 
The statute recognizes that there are cases where a criminal defendant's 
right to a fair trial may be jeopardized unless there is access not only to an 
attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the preparation of a defense. State 
v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 838, 537 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1975). Included within the 
scope of LC. 5 19-852(a) are the fourteenth amendment requirements of due 
process and equal protection as they apply to indigent defendants. 111 Britt v. 
North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,227,92 S.Ct. 431,433,30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), the 
United States Supreme Court made it clear that "state(s) must, as a matter of equal 
protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense 
or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners." It is 
equally evident that if a defendant is denied access to the basic tools of an 
adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process. right of a fair trial. 
See Grffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). However, 
what constitutes the basic tools or necessary services of an adequate defense has 
not been clearly defined, Britt v. North Carolina, supra; State v. Coronado, 98 
Idaho 421,423,565 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1977), and may indeed vary fro111 case to 
case. See State v. Powers, 96 Idaho at 838, 537 P.2d at 1374. Consequently, in 
order to determine under I.C.5 19-852(a) whether the requested services in the 
present case were necessary in order to provide the defendant with an adequate 
defense, we must review the requests individually. 
Then again, in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,65, 90 P.3d 278,290 (2003), the Idaho 
Supreme Court spoke on this subject, stating: 
The constitution does not require a state to provide expert or investigative 
assistance merely because a defendant requests it. State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 
648 P.2d 203 (1982), citing United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 
568,73 S.Ct. 391,395,97 L.Ed. 549,556 (1953). A defendant's request for 
expeit or investigative seivices should be reviewed in light of a11 circuinstances 
and be measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the 
due process clause. Id., citing Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297,298 (10th Cir. 
1966). Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a particular purpose 
in an indigent's defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are 
necessary in the interest ofjustice. State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833,838, 537 P.2d 
1369, 1374 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1089,96 S.Ct. 881,47 L.Ed.2d 99 
(1976). Such a review necessarily involves the exercise of the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and a denial of a request for investigative assistance will not be 
disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a 
decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the 
case. State v. Olin, supra. 
Most recently, in State v. Marlin, --- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 2670190, *6 (2008), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held there was no substantive difference between the standard set forth in Ake 
and the standard articulated in Olin and Lovelace. Nevertheless, in a show of deference to the 
United States Supreme Court, the Martin Court proceeded under the Ake standard and held that 
"a derendant seeking assistance at state expense must make a threshold showing that the 
assistance has probable value to address what will be a significant factor at trial, such that the 
accuracy of the jury's detem~ination would be called into question if the assistance were denied." 
Id. (citations omitted). Or put differently, "a defendant generally must inform the trial court of 
the nature of the prosecution's case and the evidence linking him to the crime, as it relates to the 
requested assistance." Id. (citations omitted) 
In this case, Mr. Nevarez made such a showing. On March 9,2008, at the hearing upon 
Mr. Nevarez's Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness, counsel for Mr. Nevarez, 
as well as counsel for a co-defendant, set forth before Judge Melanson the factual background of 
the case and the evidence that had been produced at the preliminary hearing. AF Tr. pp. 5-9. 
Counsel expressed they had great difficulty accepting the testimony of Deputy Moore and 
believed it was impossible for him to testify with such specificity about what he purportedly 
observed on a darlc night, in a fraction of a second, with his patrol vehicle passing the defendants' 
vehicle at a closing speed of 77 miles per hour. AF Tr. p. 6. Without Deputy Moore's 
questionable observations, the stop and seizure ofthe defendants' vehicle could not be justified 
because there were no traffic laws violated. 
The importance of this defense was unequivocally conveyed to the district court. AF Tr. 
pp. 7-9. As stated by counsel for a co-defendant, "[tlhe only way I can defend against [the 
justification for the stop] is to present my defense by way of an expert, to challenge the particular 
factual findings that we already know the officer has made." AF Tr. p. 15. Thus, Mr. Nevarez 
and his co-defendant sought to retain the expertise of Marc Green, Ph.D., a forensic vision and 
perception expert. 
The prosecuting attorney himself acknowledged the determination of whether reasonable 
and articulable suspicion existed was critical to the defense and therefore the veracity of Deputy 
Moore and his ability to observe certain details was likely determinative of Mr. Nevarez's motion 
to suppress. AF Tr. p. 12. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney agreed Dr. Green was qualified to 
speak about the issue at hand but nevertheless took the position that his testimony would not 
assist the trier of fact. Furthermore, the prosecuting attorney argued that allowing Mr. Nevarez to 
retain an expert witness at state expense would be "an excessive use of the State's money . . . ." 
AF Tr. p. 11. Still, Mr. Nevarez sufficiently informed the district court of the nature of the 
State's case and the evidence against him, as well as how the assistance of Dr. Green could call 
into question Deputy Moore's testimony. 
2. The district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Nevarez 's request for an expert 
at state expense. 
Judge Melanson subsequently denied Mr. Nevarez's motion in a memorandum decision 
concluding Dr. Green's testimony would not assist the trier of fact. R. 131-37. The decision to 
do so is not supported by the circumstances of this case and as a result was clearly erroneous. At 
110 point was it suggested that Dr. Green would express an opinion upon the credibility of Deputy 
Moore. Rather, Dr. Green would have provided information regarding a person's capabilities as 
they relate to perception and vision in different environments. See R. 107-1 16 (Marc Green, 
Ph.D., curriculum vitae). This testimony would have assisted the trier of fact in judging the 
veracity of the testimony. 
Additionally, the court's decision to deny Mr. Nevarez's motioil pursuant to I.R.E. 702 
was untimely and based upon the application of the wrong standard. Having not been granted the 
opportunity to even retain Dr. Green as an expert or consultant, any determination as to whether 
his testimony would be admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 702 was premature. 
In denying the motion, Judge Melanson cited State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1220 
(2003), for the proposition that "[ilt is the fact-finder's function to judge the credibility of 
witnesses." R. 137. That case is not apposite. In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court was asked 
whether I.R.E. 702 precluded a polygrapher from testifying about a polygraph examinatioil taken 
by the defendant. The proffered evidence was that the defendant had passed the polygraph and 
thus was telling the truth. Contrary to the analysis in Perry, the issue before Judge Melanson was 
whether Mr. Nevarez should be permitted to retail1 an expert witness with state fuilds under 
section 19-852(a) of the Idaho Code, not whether the officer was being truthful. Instead, without 
even having had the opportuility to retain Dr. Green, Judge Melanson denied Mr. Nevarez's 
motion in a collclusory fashion stating, "[tjhe court finds that denial of the services for an expert 
witness at this stage of the proceedings will not deny the defendant of the fuildamental fairness 
required by the due process clause. Therefore, an expenditure of funds for that purpose is not 
necessary in the interest of justice." R. 137. By applying the incorrect standard Judge Melanson 
abused his discretion and denied Mr. Nevarez his right to fundamental fairness. 
Finally, Mr. Nevarez was prejudiced by the decision denying him the opportunity to 
retain Dr. Green. At the motion to suppress hearing the prosecuting attorney argued the 
testimony of Deputy Green was uncontroverted. MS Tr. p. 65. Interestingly, at the previously 
held hearing upon Mr. Nevarez's motion lor the apportionment of funds he took a different 
position, stating: 
[M]y suggestion would be that we have the suppressioil hearing, call the witnesses 
and have the testimony. If after the court's heard the testimony, there's nothing 
wrong with the court at that point saying I need an expert to help me dissect this 
information and determine whether or not this could happen or whether this 
officer could make those observations. 
AF Tr. p. 12. Judge Wood, unaware of the prosecuting attorney's proposal because he did not 
preside over that previous hearing, accepted the state's argument and adopted the facts as set 
forth by Deputy Moore; nevertheless, he suggested Mr. Nevarez appeal the decisions because 
they were made by two separate judges. MS Tr. pp. 78-79 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Ake, where as here, "the interests of the individual and 
the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield." 
Ake, at 83. The decision denying Mr. Nevarez his entitlement to state appointed assistance of an 
expert witness violated his constitutional right to present a defense. Moreover, the decision was 
in error in light of t11e circulnstances and an abuse of discretion that infringed upon Mr. 
Nevarez's right to fundamental fairness. Mr. Nevarez was not given the opportunity to present 
his defense at the most critical time in the proceedings against him. Therefore, the district 
court's decision denying him the assistance of an expert witness at state expense must be 
overturned. 
B. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Nevarez's Motion to S u ~ ~ r e s s .  
011 appeal from the district court's decision on a motion to suppress, this Court defers to 
the findings of fact only when they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the 
record. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53,961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998); State v. Kimball, 
141 Idaho 489,491, 11 1 P.3d 625,627 (Ct. App. 2005). This Court freely reviews the trial 
court's determination as to whether, on the facts presented, constitutional standards were 
violated. DuValt, 131 Idaho at 552-53,961 P.2d at 643-44; Kirnball, 141 Idaho at 491, 111 P.3d 
at 627. 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasollahle searches and seizures, as 
applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561, 916 
P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996); citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979) and 
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). "Although a vehicle stop is 
limited in magnitude coinpared to other types of seizures, it is nonetheless a 'constitutionally 
cognizable' intrusioil and therefore may not be conducted 'at the unbridled discretion of law 
enforcement officials."' State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Ct. App. 2007); 
citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (1979). Therefore, in order to comport wit11 constitutional 
requirements, an officer is only permitted to stop a vehicle if a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion exists that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws or that the driver was 
wanted for detention on some other criminal matter. State v. Flowers, 13 1 Idaho 205,208,953 
P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Or in the context of an officer knowing a serious crime has just 
been committed, "the question is narrowed to whether there is a reasonable suspicion that the 
person under observation is connected with the crime." State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 130, 44 
P.3d 1180, 1185 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State i. Gascon, 119 Idaho 923, 928, 81 1 P.2d 1103, 
1108 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
In either context, "[tlhe reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, 
but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." Id.; citing State v. 
Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10,12,878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1994) and State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 
661, 664, 809 P.2d 522,525 (Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, the reasonableness of the suspicion 
is judged by the totality of the circumstances at the time the stop is initiated using an objective 
standard. Id.; citing Naccarato, 126 Idaho at 12, 878 P.2d a1 186 and Mason v. Dept. ofLaw 
Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748,750,653 P.2d 803,805 (Ct. App. 1982). Finally, the State bears 
the burden in demonstrating reasonable suspicion existed for a traffic stop. State v. Kimball, 141 
Idaho 489,491, 11 1 P.3d 625,627 (2005). 
1.  Deputy Moore did not have reasonable and articuable suspicion to effectuate a tvaffic 
stop and seize the vehicle operated by Mv. Nevarez. 
111 this case, reasonable and articuiable suspicion simply did not exist. To begin, Deputy 
Moore provided absolutely no testimony pertaining to the violation of a traffic law. !n fact, 
Judge Wood expressly found the stop of the vehicle was not premised upon any "observable 
violations of law in the presence of the officer. That didn't happen." MS Tr. 75. Therefore, the 
seizure in this case cannot be justified upon the violation of a traffic law or other crime 
committed in Deputy Moore's, or any other law enforcement officer's, presence and must satisfy 
constitutional requirements elsewhere. 
Arguably, the stop could be justified if Deputy Moore possessed a reasonable suspicion 
that one of the individuals in the vehicle was connected to the robbery of the Maverilc store. Put 
differently, the question becomes whether Deputy Moore had a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the four people stopped and seized were the robbers given the informatioil at hand 
about the robbe~y and the robbers before the vehicle was stopped. Again, the seizure in this case 
callnot be justified because reasonable suspicion did not exist. 
The infomation possessed by Deputy Moore at the time of the stop was that two 
Hispanic individuals with hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stoclcing caps and a dark pistol had 
just robbed the Maverik store in Rupert. MS Tr. p. 27. There was no mention of the gender of 
the suspects or whether a vehicle was involved. Nevertheless, with this description at hand, 
Deputy Moore observed a vehicle approximately seven minutes later containing four Hispanic 
individuals with bald heads. MS Tr. p. 36. The only similarity to this observation and the 
informati011 given in the all-call is the reported ethnicity of the individuals, something Deputy 
Moore admitted is not unusual in Minidolta County. MS Tr. pp. 60-61. Deputy Moore did not 
observe hooded sweatshi~ts, bandannas, stocking caps, 07 a weapon. T l~e  number of iildividuals 
observed was also different. The people observed by Deputy Moore in the vehicle he eventually 
stopped and seized did not match nor come close lo matching the description of the individuals 
connected to the robbery. 
Perhaps because the details in the all-call by dispatch and his obseivations were anything 
but a match, Deputy Moore attempted to bootstrap reasonable suspicion into existence by stating 
he was able to obseive the four individuals "look at me and [with] varying expressions" followed 
by "quite a bit of movement, turning around [and] looking." MS Tr. pp. 37-38. These 
observations were admittedly made in a fraction of a second. MS Tr. p. 55. Still, Deputy Moore 
suggested these movements were "furtive."' Besides the fact that what Deputy Moore 
purportedly observed was in fact the opposite of being furtive, any inference of nervousness 
attributable to Mr. Nevarez and the three others in his vehicle is of little value and does not give 
rise to a finding of reasonable suspicion. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431,435, 146 P.3d 697,701 
(Ct. App. 2006). Similarly, driving late at night is a lawful activity and does not give rise to 
reasoilable suspicion. See State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1010, 783 P.2d 874, 877 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
In spite of this, Judge Wood, referencing State v. Gscon, 119 Idaho 932,812 P.2d 439 
(1991), found reasonable suspicion existed by a "razor thin" margin. MS Tr. p. 79. Such a 
' Furtive is defined as "done or acting in a stealthy manner, as if to hinder observation; 
surreptitious; stealthy; sneaky." Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition 
(1978), p. 567. 
finding is in error and violates established constitutional standards. Moreover, any reliance upon 
Gascon is misplaced. 
In Gascon, law ellforcement was informed that a bank in Twin Falls had been robbed by a 
"man approximately five feet four inches, with blonde hair wearing a baseball cap and jacket." 
Gascon, 119 Idaho at 933,812 P.2d at 240. In response, law enforcement immediately set up a 
laadblock on the roadway which provided the quicltest route to the interstate highway. Shortly 
thereafter a vehicle, being driven by a11 individual matching the general description, sans baseball 
cap and jacket, was seen approaching the roadblock leaning over in his vehicle. Though the 
central issue was whether the roadblock was lawful, the Gascon Court nonetheless held, without 
citation to any legal authority whatsoever, that in light of the circumstai~ces the investigatory stop 
in that case was proper. Id. at 934, 812 P.2d at 241. 
The circumstances present in Gascon included: the correct number of suspects; matching 
gender and general descriptioil of suspect; proximity to robbery location on a roadway which is 
the quickest route to the interstate highway; and suspicious movements observed by law 
e~~forcement. Again, in this case, the only confirmed detail from the general description was the 
reported ethnicity of the suspects. The number of suspects did not match, there was no reference 
to the gender of the suspects, and the clothing description could not be confirmed. Moreover, the 
vehicle seized by Deputy Moore was not traveling on the quicltest route to the interstate highway, 
instead it was miles from the robbery location traveling on one of four major roadways leaving 
Rupert. Though at first glance Gascon appears to be similar to the circumstances in this case, 
upon close analysis it becomes evident they are quite different and distinguishable. 
Moreover, even if Gascon were indistinguishable from this case, it was improperly 
decided and should be overturned or limited to solely the facts presented in that case. The rule of 
stave decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed unless it is manifestly wrong, has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principals of law and remedy continued injustice. State v. Dean, 137 Idaho 6 ,  9,43 P.3d 
765,768 (2002). 
As pointed out in Justice Bistline's dissent in Gascon, the majority improperly framed the 
issue as "whether the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon could have 
been the banlc robber." Gascon, 119 Idaho at 940, 812 P.2d at 247, n. 4 (emphasis in original). 
Instead, the majority should have asked "whether the police had a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the person who they stopped and seized was the bank robber." Id. at 940, 812 P.2d 
at 247. The analysis used by the Gascon Court is manifestly wrong and encourages reasonable 
suspicion analysis to delve into the regrettable and impermissible realm of speculation and 
hunches. 
Furthennore, as noted above, the majority's opinion fails to cite any legal authority in 
determining whether the seizure of Gascon's vehicle was proper. See Id. at 934, 812 P.2d at 241. 
Doing so is unjust and unwise. But most importantly, doing so has resulted in confusion and 
disruption to well settled principles of constitutional law that have led to continued injustice as 
evidenced by this case. The flaw in Gascon is that it holds, in essence, that law enforcement can 
seize drivers in this state for "ilmocuous activity." See Id. at 940, 812 P.2d at 247 (J. Bistline, 
dissenting). Gascon is illogical and must be overturned or limited to solely the facts presented in 
that case. 
In sum, reasonable suspicion does not exist when the occupants of a car happen to be the 
same ethnicity as suspects in a crime even when the occupants purportedly engage in non-furtive 
activity. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, and in light of the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the 
i~idividuals in the vehicle were the robbers of the Maverik store in Rupert at the time Deputy 
Moore effectuated a trafic stop. Because the stop was unsupported by a warrant, probable cause, 
or even reasonable and articulable suspicion, the seizure was unconstitutional. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the district court's decision 
denying Mr. Nevarez's Motion to Suppress and grant the motion. Alternatively, it should reverse 
the district court's denial of the Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings 
1 
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